



AUTO ATTENDANT / RESEARCH & PRACTICAL GUIDANCE

STIR/SHAKEN Attestation A, B and C Explained

Get a business phone number with a simple auto attendant menu from Auto Attendant. A caller picks who they need and the call rings that person's own mobile, so nobody on your team has to publish a personal number.

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The short answer

Every call your business places over an IP phone network in the US or Canada is supposed to carry a digital signature from the provider that put it on the network. Inside that signature is a single letter: **A**, **B** or **C**. It says how sure the provider is that the caller is allowed to use the number shown as caller ID.

- **A (full attestation):** the provider knows the customer and knows the customer has the right to use that number.
- **B (partial attestation):** the provider knows the customer but cannot confirm their right to the number displayed.
- **C (gateway attestation):** the provider is passing along a call it cannot vouch for, such as one arriving from an international route or an older network.

You do not choose the letter. Your provider does, under rules that make it the provider's decision. If your calls are rated B or C, the fix is almost always about **which provider originates the call and which number it displays**, not about your business itself.

This guide explains the levels, the common reasons small-business calls get a lower rating, what the US and Canadian rules say as of October 2026, and the questions to put to your phone provider. It is educational information, not legal advice.

What STIR/SHAKEN actually does

STIR/SHAKEN is a caller ID authentication framework. The FCC summarises it this way: calls on IP phone networks "can have their caller ID 'signed' as legitimate by originating carriers and validated by other carriers before reaching consumers" ([FCC, Call Authentication](#)). STIR is the IETF signing method, defined in [RFC 8224](#) (February 2018). SHAKEN is the industry profile built on top of it, and [RFC 8588](#) (May 2019) adds the "attest" claim that carries the A, B or C.

Two limits are worth knowing from the start:

1. **It only works on IP networks.** The FCC notes the framework "is only operational in IP networks," so providers still using older network technology must either upgrade or work on a non-IP solution ([FCC; 47 CFR 64.6303](#)). A call that crosses an old segment can arrive with no signature at all.
2. **A valid signature does not decide what happens to the call.** RFC 8224 says verification "does not entail any particular treatment of the request," and that handling afterwards depends on "local policy" ([RFC 8224, section 6.2.1](#)). The FCC describes authentication as something that "helps supports providers' blocking decisions and call labeling efforts" ([FCC](#)), not as the label itself.

The three attestation levels

RFC 8588 defines the claim with three values, A, B and C, corresponding to "Full Attestation," "Partial Attestation" and "Gateway Attestation," and points to the industry standard ATIS-1000074 for the full definitions ([RFC 8588, section 4](#)).

Level	Name	Standard wording (RFC 8588)	Plain wording used by a carrier (Twilio)
A	Full Attestation	The provider "can fully attest to the calling identity"	"The caller is known and has the right to use the phone number as the caller ID"
B	Partial Attestation	The provider "originated a telephone call but cannot fully attest to the calling identity"	"The customer is known, it is unknown if they have the right to use the caller ID being used"
C	Gateway Attestation	"The lowest level of attestation," a call received "from a telephone gateway that does not support PASSporT or STI"	"It doesn't meet the requirements of A or B including international calls"

Sources: [RFC 8588](#); [Twilio Docs](#).

ATIS-1000074 spells out the conditions. For A, the signing provider originates the call, has a direct authenticated relationship with the customer and can identify it, and "has established a verified association with the telephone number used for the call." B meets the first two conditions but not the third. C is for a provider that "has no relationship with the originator of the call (e.g., international gateways)", or that lacks the information to give A or B. What proves a customer's right to a number is left to provider policy; the standard's examples include a number the provider assigned to that customer and a number from another provider that the customer is authorized to use ([ATIS-1000074.v003, clause 5.2.4](#)).

The key idea in A is the **number-to-customer link**: the provider knows who you are and knows the number is yours to use. B means one of those two pieces is missing (usually the second). C means the provider is only vouching that the call passed through it.

Who decides your rating: the provider, by rule

In the US, 47 CFR 64.6301 required voice service providers to fully implement STIR/SHAKEN in their IP networks by June 30, 2021, authenticating caller ID on the SIP calls they originate and verifying it on the calls they terminate ([47 CFR 64.6301\(a\)](#)).

A provider may hire a third party to do the technical signing, but under the current rule it must still make "all attestation-level decisions" for the calls it originates, and every call must be signed with the provider's own certificate ([47 CFR 64.6301\(b\)](#)). Those third-party conditions come from the FCC's order FCC 24-120, published in the Federal Register on August 19, 2025 and effective September 18, 2025 ([Federal Register 2025-15809](#)).

Further along the call path, gateway providers (US carriers that receive calls directly from foreign providers) must sign unauthenticated calls that show US numbers, and intermediate providers must pass existing signatures along unaltered except for technical or security reasons ([47 CFR 64.6302](#)). Separately, every provider, whether or not it has a STIR/SHAKEN obligation, must file in the FCC's Robocall Mitigation Database ([FCC](#); [47 CFR 64.6305](#)).

What this means for you: the rules bind providers, not their business customers. There is no form a business files with the FCC to "get A." What you can do is make it easy for your provider to know the number is yours.

Why a small business's calls land on B or C

No source publishes a universal rulebook for how each provider assigns levels; ATIS-1000074 sets the framework and each provider applies it. Carrier documentation shows the common patterns, though:

Situation	Typical result	Why
You call out through the provider that issued (or ported in) your number, showing that number	A	Telnyx documents "Call from owned phone number: A" (Telnyx)
You call out through provider X but display a number that lives at provider Y (a softphone, dialer or second service showing your main number)	B	Telnyx: "Call from non-owned or verified number: B" (Telnyx); Twilio's B wording covers exactly this (Twilio)
A call is transferred using SIP REFER	B, and the original signature is not preserved	Telnyx call-transfer table (Telnyx)
The call enters the US network from an international route	C	Twilio: C includes "international calls" (Twilio); gateway providers sign such calls (47 CFR 64.6302(d))
Part of the path uses an older, non-IP network	Signature may be missing	STIR/SHAKEN only works on IP networks (FCC)
A call to your number is forwarded to a mobile	Depends on the provider	Telnyx keeps the original signature and adds a diversion (DIV) signature with attestation A; Twilio signs an unsigned incoming call with its own C plus DIV signing when forwarding (Telnyx ; Twilio)

The most common small-business cause is the second row. A business keeps its main number with one company (say, the old landline carrier or a phone-menu service) and makes outbound calls through another (a VoIP app, a call-centre tool, an appointment-reminder platform), setting caller ID to the main number. The outbound provider knows the customer but did not issue the number, so B is the honest answer.

Attestation is not the same as a spam label

A call with attestation A can still show "Spam Likely," and a call with B can ring through with no warning. The labels come from analytics run by the terminating carrier or its partners under their own "local policy" ([RFC 8224](#)). Attestation is one input among many.

Nor does A guarantee a "Verified" mark or your business name on the screen. In December 2025 the FCC *proposed* requiring terminating providers to transmit verified caller name or other identity information "whenever they transmit an indication that a call has received an A-level attestation" ([Federal Register 2025-22063](#), [FCC 25-76](#)). That it is a proposal tells you it is not yet a requirement; display today depends on the receiving carrier and the handset.

If your real problem is the label, start with our guides on [why a business number shows up as spam](#) and [what to do about "Spam Likely"](#). For a deeper treatment of the standards, see our [STIR/SHAKEN research brief](#).

How to move from B or C toward A: a checklist

These steps follow from how the levels are defined. The exact proof each provider accepts varies, so treat the provider's answer as the final word.

1. **List every system that places calls showing your business number.** Desk phones, softphone apps, mobile apps, dialers, reminder tools, answering services. Note which company carries each one's outbound calls.
2. **Match number and provider.** For each system, ask: did this provider issue the number, or port it in? If not, that system is a likely B.
3. **Consolidate where you can.** Make outbound calls through the provider that holds the number, or port the number to the provider you call out through. This is the most direct route to A, because that provider knows the number is yours.
4. **Where a third-party tool must show your number, ask how it verifies your right to use it.** Some providers have a process for confirming a customer's right to a number they don't host; ask what it is and what level results.
5. **Stop displaying numbers you don't control.** Showing a number you don't own (or a number belonging to a client) invites B at best.
6. **Avoid sending domestic calls over international routes.** Cheap routes that enter through a gateway tend to arrive as C.
7. **Re-check after any change.** A new phone app, a new reminder service or a port can change the level overnight.

Questions to send your provider

You can paste these into a support ticket:

- "When we place calls showing [number], what attestation level do you sign: A, B or C?"
- "Do you sign with your own STI certificate, or does a third party sign for you? If a third party signs, do you still make the attestation decision?" (Under [47 CFR 64.6301\(b\)](#), the provider must.)
- "What do you need from us to confirm our right to use [number] if it is hosted with another provider?"
- "Are any of our calls routed over non-IP or international routes where the signature could be lost or downgraded?"
- "When you forward or transfer a call, do you keep the original signature?"
- "Is your company listed in the FCC Robocall Mitigation Database?"

Canada and the US side by side

	United States	Canada
Legal basis	47 CFR 64.6301 and related sections	Telecom Decision CRTC 2021-123 (6 April 2021), a condition of service under ss. 24 and 24.1 of the Telecommunications Act
Implementation date	June 30, 2021 for voice service providers' IP networks	30 November 2021 for IP-based voice calls
Governance	STI Governance Authority and Policy Administrator (defined in 47 CFR 64.6300)	Canadian Secure Token Governance Authority (CSTGA), approved in Decision CRTC 2019-403
Scope	IP networks; non-IP networks must upgrade or work on a non-IP solution	IP-based voice calls
Provider filings	Robocall Mitigation Database for all providers	Readiness reports (due 31 August 2021), then six-monthly status reports, which Decision CRTC 2025-343 (16 December 2025) ended for most providers

Sources: [47 CFR 64.6301](#); [47 CFR 64.6303](#); [CRTC 2021-123](#); [CRTC 2025-343](#); [FCC](#).

Cross-border calls use separate certificates. Telnyx, for example, signs Canada-to-Canada calls with its Canadian certificate and calls from a Canadian number to a US number with its US certificate ([Telnyx](#)). The A, B and C values themselves come from the same SHAKEN claim on both sides of the border ([RFC 8588](#)).

What is changing (as of October 2026)

The FCC has several open proceedings that could change how attestation works. None of the proposals below appeared as a final rule in a Federal Register search on 28 October 2026.

Date	Document	What it does	Status
Aug 19, 2025	FCC 24-120 (FR 2025-15809)	Third-party signing allowed only if the provider makes attestation decisions and uses its own certificate	In force since Sept 18, 2025
June 16, 2025	FCC 25-25 (FR 2025-10998)	Proposes requiring non-IP caller ID authentication frameworks	Proposal
Dec 5, 2025	FCC 25-76 (FR 2025-22063)	Proposes verified caller name for A-attested calls and disclosure of calls from outside the US	Proposal
Jan 6, 2026	FR 2026-00010	Robocall Mitigation Database accuracy duties; \$10,000 base forfeiture per violation for false or inaccurate filings	Final rule, effective Feb 5, 2026
July 9, 2026	FCC 26-32 (FR 2026-13874)	Proposes "codifying attestation levels, defining improper attestations, and specifying permissible mechanisms for verifying number-to-customer associations"	Proposal; reply comments were due Sept 8, 2026

The July 2026 proposal is the one to watch. If adopted, it would turn today's industry definitions of A, B and C into FCC rules and set out how providers must confirm that a number belongs to the customer. For a business that already calls out through the provider holding its numbers, little should change. For a business that relies on third-party tools displaying its main number, verification could become stricter.

If your business number only receives calls

Many small businesses use their main number mainly for inbound calls: customers call, a menu answers, and the call rings someone's mobile. Attestation applies to calls a provider *originates*, so the signature on an incoming customer call belongs to the customer's carrier, not to you.

Where attestation does touch you is the **callback**. If staff return calls from their own mobiles, the customer sees the mobile number, signed by the mobile carrier that issued it. A number the provider assigned to its own customer is the standard's first example of a verified number-to-customer link, the basis for A (ATIS-1000074.v003, clause 5.2.4). The trade-off is that customers may not recognise that number. If you want callbacks to show the business number, they need to go out through a provider that can attest to it, which brings you back to the checklist above.

FAQ

Does attestation A guarantee "Verified" or my name on the screen? No. Display is up to the receiving carrier and the phone. The FCC's December 2025 proposal to require verified caller name for A-attested calls is not yet a rule (FR 2025-22063).

Can I check what level my calls get? Ask your provider; it makes the decision and should be able to tell you. Some platforms expose the result: Twilio reports the attestation it gave an outgoing call in a status callback field, and shows the verification result (for example TN-Validation-Passed-A) on calls it receives (Twilio). A test call to a line that displays this can tell you what arrives.

Do I need to register my business for STIR/SHAKEN? The FCC's STIR/SHAKEN and Robocall Mitigation Database rules apply to providers ([47 CFR 64.6301](#); [47 CFR 64.6305](#)). Your part is giving your provider whatever proof it asks for that the number is yours.

Why do my calls get B when the number really is mine? Usually because the provider placing the call did not issue it. Being yours is not enough; the signing provider has to *know* it is yours.

Is a C rating a sign of wrongdoing? No. C describes where the call came from, such as an international route or a gateway, not the caller's intent ([RFC 8588](#)). It does give the receiving side less to go on.

Does Canada use the same levels? Canada uses the same SHAKEN framework under CRTC Decision 2021-123, with its own governance authority, the CSTGA ([CRTC 2021-123](#)). See the [glossary](#) for related terms.

Auto Attendant lines answer inbound calls only and place no outbound calls, so the attestation questions above apply to whatever your team uses to call customers back.

Sources

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17. [Compliance and Enforcement and Telecom Decision CRTC 2025-343](#) - CRTC, 16 December 2025; ended semi-annual STIR/SHAKEN reporting for most providers; accessed 2026-10-28, read via Internet Archive copy.

Source links

Links cited in this article, in order of first appearance. Full addresses are provided for readers using extracted text.

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2. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8224>
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About Auto Attendant

Auto Attendant gives a small business one phone number and a recorded menu that sends each caller to the right person. The call rings the mobile that person already carries, using their normal dialler and their normal mobile plan. Pricing is a single flat monthly fee for the whole company rather than a charge for each user, and there is no app, desk phone or hardware to install.

One number, one menu, the phones you already own

A caller dials the business number, hears a short greeting and chooses an option. Each option can ring one mobile, ring several at once so whoever is free answers first, or try people one after another in a set order. There is no limit on how many people sit on the receiving end, because nobody is billed per seat. Setup is done by the owner in a few minutes: pick a number, write the greeting, and point each option at a mobile.

What it deliberately is not

An auto attendant routes a call; it does not answer one. Nobody at Auto Attendant speaks to callers, and no AI stands in for a receptionist. A business that wants its calls handled, messages taken and appointments booked wants an answering service, which is a different product at a different price. A business that needs call recording, queues, agent dashboards or CRM integration wants a contact centre platform. Auto Attendant is for the case where the call should simply reach the right pocket.

Keeping personal numbers off the internet

The business number is the only number a caller ever sees. Personal mobile numbers are never displayed and never given out, which is what lets an owner put a number on a website, an invoice, a van or a Google Business Profile without handing a personal line to everyone who finds it. An existing advertised number can be ported across and kept, and the old line keeps working while the port is in progress.

Work with Auto Attendant

Visit [Auto Attendant](#) to see [how it works](#), [how it compares](#) to a personal mobile, Google Voice and a full phone platform, and the current [pricing](#).

Telephone number portability, emergency calling and caller-ID rules differ by country and change over time. Articles published here describe general practice and cite primary regulator and carrier sources; they are not a guarantee of any timeline, and they are not legal or regulatory advice for a specific business.

Website: <https://autoattendant.io>

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