



AUTO ATTENDANT / RESEARCH & PRACTICAL GUIDANCE

STIR/SHAKEN in Canada: What the CRTC Requires

Get a business phone number with a simple auto attendant menu from Auto Attendant. A caller picks who they need and the call rings that person's own mobile, so nobody on your team has to publish a personal number.

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What STIR/SHAKEN is, in one paragraph

STIR/SHAKEN is how Canadian phone companies digitally sign the caller ID on internet-based (IP) voice calls, so the company at the receiving end can check whether the number shown is genuine. STIR (Secure Telephone Identity Revisited, the name of the IETF working group; CRTC and CST-GA texts write "Telephony") is the IETF technical standard; SHAKEN (Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs) is the framework for putting it into carrier networks. The Canadian governance body puts it this way: "STIR defines how you could implement the protocol, while SHAKEN documents how you will implement the protocol" ([CST-GA](#)). In the CRTC's words, providers "certify the extent to which a given caller's identity can be trusted", that information travels in "tokens", and the called party's provider uses it to verify the caller ID, which depends on "Certificate Authorities (CAs) administering and issuing certificates" to providers ([Decision CRTC 2019-403](#)).

This page covers the Canadian rules as of October 2026. It is educational information, not legal advice. For the US rules, the attestation statistics and how spam labels work, see our research brief [STIR/SHAKEN signs the call. It does not vouch for the caller](#).

Why the CRTC mandated it

The problem is caller ID spoofing. The CRTC lists the illegitimate versions it sees: a caller ID altered "to match the first 6-digits of your telephone number" ("neighbouring"), altered "to display your own telephone number" ("mirroring"), or altered to pose as "a recognizable brand or a government organization" ([CRTC, Caller ID Spoofing](#)). It also lists legitimate uses, such as a call centre showing its client's number or a doctor showing the hospital's call-back number. Telemarketers who spoof break the Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules, with fines "up to \$1,500 per violation for an individual and up to \$15,000 per violation for a corporation" (same page).

In Decision 2018-32 the CRTC concluded that STIR/SHAKEN "is likely the only current viable solution that can provide consumers with a measure of additional trust in caller ID" and that it would make call filtering and network blocking more effective ([Decision CRTC 2018-32](#)).

How the deadline moved: a timeline

Date	Decision	What it did
25 January 2018	2018-32	Expected providers to authenticate and verify caller ID on IP calls "by no later than 31 March 2019"; asked the industry to set up a Canadian certificate administrator; required six-monthly progress reports.
9 December 2019	2019-402	Moved the deadline to "no later than 30 September 2020" and asked each provider for an action plan by 24 February 2020.
9 December 2019	2019-403	Approved the Canadian Secure Token Governance Authority (CSTGA) as Governance Authority, with progress reports every six months.
15 September 2020	2019-402-2	Granted Rogers' request for nine more months: "The extension to 30 June 2021 will apply to all telecommunications service providers." Aligned Canada with the US date.
6 April 2021	2021-123	Made STIR/SHAKEN a condition of service, effective 30 November 2021; readiness reports due 31 August 2021; status reports every six months from 31 May 2022.
5 August 2021	2021-267	Found that refusing certificates to every provider without direct access to numbers was "neither necessary nor appropriate".
16 December 2025	2025-343	Ended semi-annual reporting for most providers.

The Rogers extension request cited COVID-19 resource shifts, missing VoIP interconnections between providers, unfinished standards, and the US date of 30 June 2021 ([Decision CRTC 2019-402-2](#)).

The Canadian rule: Decision 2021-123

The operative rule is short. Under sections 24 and 24.1 of the Telecommunications Act, "as a condition of offering and providing telecommunications services, TSPs must implement STIR/SHAKEN in order to authenticate and validate IP-based voice calls, effective 30 November 2021" ([Decision CRTC 2021-123](#)).

Three features matter for businesses:

- **It applies to every provider.** The Independent Telecommunications Providers Association argued the mandate would be "overly burdensome for smaller TSPs". The CRTC disagreed: "Excluding some TSPs from the obligation ... would undermine the effectiveness of the system" ([2021-123](#)).
- **It covers IP calls only.** The obligation "applies to calls that travel over a TSP's IP-based network, including any portion of its network that is able to initiate, transit, or terminate IP-based calls" (same decision). The CRTC accepted in 2018 that STIR/SHAKEN cannot be deployed "on legacy circuit-switched networks" but expected providers to extend its benefits to non-IP networks "to the largest extent possible" ([2018-32](#)).

- **It is a duty to sign and verify, not to block.** Nothing in 2021-123 tells a provider to reject an unsigned call. The CRTC framed it as "a tool to identify the level of trustworthiness of a call" that will "empower consumers to take the appropriate actions" (2021-123).

Who runs it: CST-GA, Policy Administrator, Certificate Authorities

Decision 2019-403 sets out three roles (2019-403):

1. **Governance Authority** ensures "the integrity of the issuance, management, security, and use of certificates". In Canada that is the CST-GA, founded by Bell Canada, Eastlink, Rogers, SaskTel, Shaw, TELUS and Videotron with the Canadian LNP Consortium.
2. **Policy Administrator**, selected by the Governance Authority, applies its rules and makes sure certificates "are issued only to authorized TSPs". The CRTC calls it "the administrator and primary trust anchor of the system".
3. **Certificate Authorities** "issue certificates to validated TSPs".

The CST-GA says it "has selected Neustar as the Policy Administrator and has authorized Neustar and Sansay as Certification Authorities" (CST-GA, About). Its participants page also shows a third Certification Authority logo (Somos) and the logos of participating providers (CST-GA, Participants). The founders' start-up fund was \$250,000, with about \$325,000 a year in projected operating costs once vendors were in place (2019-403).

Who can get a certificate. Originally only providers with direct access to Canadian numbering resources qualified. Decision 2021-267 explained the consequence: calls from other providers "would only be authenticated when they reach an eligible TSP" and "would likely only be given level B or level C attestation". The CRTC told the CST-GA to rewrite its eligibility rules within 60 days so that access is refused only where a provider "cannot be trusted to maintain the integrity of the STIR/SHAKEN framework" (2021-267). The CST-GA's current sign-up form still starts with "Do you have direct access to telephone numbers?" and lets CRTC-registered voice providers join "either as a Shareholder or a Non-Shareholder Participant" (CST-GA, TSPs).

Attestation levels A, B and C

The attestation is the signing provider's statement about what it knows. RFC 8588 defines the values A, B and C as "'Full Attestation', 'Partial Attestation', and 'Gateway Attestation'" and points to ATIS for the definitions (RFC 8588). From ATIS-1000074.v003 (ATIS):

Level	The signing provider
A, Full	Originated the call, "has a direct authenticated relationship with the customer and can identify the customer", and "has established a verified association with the telephone number used for the call".
B, Partial	Originated the call and knows the customer, but "has NOT established a verified association with the telephone number".
C, Gateway	"Has no relationship with the originator of the call (e.g., international gateways)."

ATIS leaves the proof of number ownership to each provider: "Ultimately it is up to service provider policy to decide what constitutes 'legitimate right to assert a TN'". Examples it gives include a number assigned by the signing provider, or a provider that "has ascertained that the customer is authorized to use a TN", including numbers "assigned by another service provider" ([ATIS-1000074.v003](#)).

Providers versus small businesses: who has to do what

The obligations in 2021-123 and 2025-343 fall on telecommunications service providers. A business that buys phone service is not a TSP and has no filing or signing duty under these decisions. Your carrier signs your outgoing calls; the carrier of the person you call verifies them.

What you control is the information your carrier relies on: which number you present as caller ID, whether that number is yours, and which provider places the call. If an outside call centre or dialler places calls showing your main number, that provider decides the attestation, and under ATIS it can only give an A if it has verified you may use the number.

Why your calls may still show "unverified" or be mislabelled

Several causes are on the public record, none of which you can fix by yourself:

- **The call was not IP end to end.** The CRTC's consumer page lists "network compatibility", "calls being not entirely performed over an IP-voice network" and "complex call scenarios" ([CRTC, Caller ID Spoofing](#)).
- **The recipient's phone cannot show it.** The same page says "only smartphones are able to display the STIR/SHAKEN information".
- **The recipient's carrier does not send a display indicator.** Decision 2025-343 still asks providers "Whether you send the Verstat (Verification Status) parameter ... to end users", which means sending it is not universal ([2025-343](#)).
- **Your provider signed with B or C.** That happens when it has not verified your number, or when the call arrives from a provider without its own certificate ([2021-267](#)).
- **Labels come from analytics, not the signature.** The IETF standard says verification "does not entail any particular treatment of the request" ([RFC 8224](#)), and the CRTC expects STIR/SHAKEN "to partner with the analytical capacity of service providers" ([CRTC, Caller ID Spoofing](#)). A fully signed call can still be labelled.

Reporting changes in 2025: Decision 2025-343

On 16 December 2025 the CRTC found that "the TSPs with a STIR/SHAKEN token have worked diligently" and that "on average, TSPs employ STIR/SHAKEN successfully to authenticate the vast majority of their IP-based voice calls" ([Decision CRTC 2025-343](#)). It therefore:

- ended semi-annual reports for providers that had already filed four, effective 16 December 2025, replacing them with "targeted requests for information" when needed;

- required providers that have or will obtain a token but had not filed four reports to file "two annual reports", due 31 May each year, after which "No further reports will be required".

The CRTC kept oversight for providers "just now converting from legacy Time-Division Multiplexing networks to IP networks" (same decision). The simplified report asks for counts by attestation level (A, B, C, none) for calls sent and received.

What changed in 2026

We checked the CRTC's 2026 lists of decisions and notices (archived copy dated 13 August 2026) for STIR/SHAKEN items. We found no 2026 decision changing the STIR/SHAKEN mandate or the 2025-343 reporting regime. Two related items:

- **Decision 2026-52**, titled "Mandatory call traceback participation for all providers of voice telecommunications services" ([CRTC Decisions 2026](#)). Traceback is how providers trace a nuisance call back to its source. As its title says, the decision makes taking part in traceback mandatory for every voice provider. We could not load the decision text, so we do not describe its other terms.
- **Compliance and Enforcement Notice of Consultation 2026-132**, "Review of the Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules", with interventions due 27 July 2026 and replies due 11 August 2026 ([CRTC Notices 2026](#)). It concerns the telemarketing rules, not the STIR/SHAKEN mandate itself. No decision appears in the CRTC's lists through 13 August 2026; until one issues, the current rules stay in force.

What to do: a checklist for a Canadian business

- [] **Ask your carrier in writing** whether it signs your outgoing calls itself and what attestation level they normally get. If it is not A, ask what it needs from you to verify the number.
- [] **Check whether your provider holds its own certificate.** The [CST-GA participants page](#) shows participating providers. A reseller may be signed by its upstream carrier instead.
- [] **Present only numbers you own**, and the same number customers call back on.
- [] **If a call centre or dialler calls for you**, ask that provider what attestation your calls get and how it verified your right to the number.
- [] **If someone spoofs your number**, the CRTC points to its complaint process for telemarketing and, for suspected fraud, the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre at 1-888-495-8501 ([CRTC, Caller ID Spoofing](#)). Keep dates, times and the numbers called.
- [] **Do not expect a checkmark** on every phone; display depends on the device and the recipient's carrier.

Our [Canada page](#) covers Canadian numbers, and the [glossary](#) defines terms such as caller ID and porting.

FAQ

Does STIR/SHAKEN block spam?

Not by itself. It signs and verifies caller ID; what a carrier does next is its own policy ([RFC 8224](#)). Blocking in Canada comes from other measures: providers without an opt-in filtering service must block calls whose caller ID exceeds 15 digits or is not dialable under the North American Numbering Plan ([CRTC](#), [Caller ID Spoofing](#)).

Does it cover landlines?

Only the IP parts of the network. The mandate covers IP-based calls; old circuit-switched equipment cannot do STIR/SHAKEN, and the CRTC treats that as a shrinking gap as networks move to IP ([2018-32](#); [2021-123](#)).

Is it the same as the US system?

Same standards, separate governance. Both use the IETF and ATIS specifications. The US has its own Governance Authority and Policy Administrator (the CRTC noted iconectiv was named US Policy Administrator on 30 May 2019), while Canada uses the CST-GA ([2019-403](#)). The CRTC aligned Canada's 30 June 2021 date with the US ([2019-402-2](#)), but Canada gave smaller providers no separate deadline.

Auto Attendant answers inbound calls only and places no outbound calls, so the attestation on your outgoing calls depends on whichever provider places them.

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Source links

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About Auto Attendant

Auto Attendant gives a small business one phone number and a recorded menu that sends each caller to the right person. The call rings the mobile that person already carries, using their normal dialler and their normal mobile plan. Pricing is a single flat monthly fee for the whole company rather than a charge for each user, and there is no app, desk phone or hardware to install.

One number, one menu, the phones you already own

A caller dials the business number, hears a short greeting and chooses an option. Each option can ring one mobile, ring several at once so whoever is free answers first, or try people one after another in a set order. There is no limit on how many people sit on the receiving end, because nobody is billed per seat. Setup is done by the owner in a few minutes: pick a number, write the greeting, and point each option at a mobile.

What it deliberately is not

An auto attendant routes a call; it does not answer one. Nobody at Auto Attendant speaks to callers, and no AI stands in for a receptionist. A business that wants its calls handled, messages taken and appointments booked wants an answering service, which is a different product at a different price. A business that needs call recording, queues, agent dashboards or CRM integration wants a contact centre platform. Auto Attendant is for the case where the call should simply reach the right pocket.

Keeping personal numbers off the internet

The business number is the only number a caller ever sees. Personal mobile numbers are never displayed and never given out, which is what lets an owner put a number on a website, an invoice, a van or a Google Business Profile without handing a personal line to everyone who finds it. An existing advertised number can be ported across and kept, and the old line keeps working while the port is in progress.

Work with Auto Attendant

Visit [Auto Attendant](#) to see [how it works](#), [how it compares](#) to a personal mobile, Google Voice and a full phone platform, and the current [pricing](#).

Telephone number portability, emergency calling and caller-ID rules differ by country and change over time. Articles published here describe general practice and cite primary regulator and carrier sources; they are not a guarantee of any timeline, and they are not legal or regulatory advice for a specific business.

Website: <https://autoattendant.io>

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